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ABSTRACT 
This study provides a link between accounting, managerial 
discretion and monetary policy. Monetary authorities 
encourage banking institutions to supply credit to the 
economy. Increased bank supply of credit is a good thing 
but too much of a good can be a bad thing. This paper 
investigates under what circumstances excessive loan 
supply ceases to be a good thing and how bank managers 
react to this. After examining 82 bank samples, I find that 
(i) bank underestimate the level of reserves to boost 
credit supply in line with expectations of monetary 
authorities, particularly, in Asia and UK (ii) consistent with 
the credit smoothing hypothesis, US and Chinese banks 
smooth credit supply to minimize unintended stock 
market signaling; (iii) managerial priority during a 
recession is to smooth credit over time rather than to 
boost credit supply; (iv) non-performing loans, bank 
portfolio risk and loan portfolio size are significant 
determinants of the level of loan loss reserves; and (v) 
credit risk, proxy by loan growth, do not have a significant 
impact on loan loss reserves but tend to have some 
significant effect during a recession, particularly, when 
change in loans is negative. The implications of these 
findings are two-fold: (i) bank managers use their 
discretion over reserves to influence bank credit supply; 
(ii) bank supply of credit is not solely driven by loan 
demand but by a combination of several factors, 
particularly, capital market concerns, the need to avoid 
scrutiny from monetary authorities, and country-specific 
factors.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper seeks to provide a link between managerial discretion, an accounting number 
(loan loss reserves) and monetary transmission mechanism. The paper begins with the 
well-known premise that monetary authorities supply money or credit to the economy 
through banking institutions.  
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If banking institutions decline to supply credit or issue loan, then, these institutions may 
lose their legitimacy. Therefore, banks will supply credit or loan.  
Motivations to increase bank credit supply may derive from the need to generate higher 
profit or due to policy requirements by central bankers. Managers are, particularly, 
concerned about excessive supply of bank credit because of its potential to communicate 
unintended signal to the stock market, particularly, investors. Therefore, managers can 
expect to take on certain actions to address this concern. Motivated by this concern, this 
study investigates one possible action that managers might take - credit smoothing. 
Particularly, I examine whether banks smooth credit over time and under what conditions 
they do this. 
A second motivation for this study is to investigate bank-specific determinants of loan loss 
reserves, not provisions. Extant research has already investigated the determinants of 
provisions. However, there is a scant literature on determinants of loan loss reserves
1
. 
Therefore, this paper aims to fill this gap by examining bank-specific determinants of level 
of loan loss reserves. I note that banks in several countries have different accounting rules, 
different supervisory rules, different loan loss policies, and possibly different incentives 
that might affect provisioning and reserve behavior. To control for these differences, I 
examine country-specific reserve behaviour. 
The findings in the study make some contribution to the existing literature. First, this study 
contributes to the banking literature by investigating bank-specific determinants of loan 
loss reserves by extending the provisioning literature to loan loss reserves. An approach 
unique to this paper is the inclusion of an important determinant, the size of bank loan 
portfolio rather than the total asset, a common proxy for bank size across mainstream 
studies
2
. The rational for this is because, intuitively, loan loss reserves should have a direct 
impact on bank loan portfolio not necessarily on total asset.
3
 Third, this study contributes 
to the monetary economics literature by providing another explanation as to why actual 
monetary supply outcomes falls below expected outcomes. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 distinguishes between 
provisions and reserves. Second 3 review the existing literature. Section 4 discusses the 
data, sample selection and methodology. Section 5 discusses the main results. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Hasan and Wall (2004) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) 
2 (For example, Bhat, 1996; Ahmed et al., 1999; Lobo and Yang, 2001; Hassan and Wall, 2004; Kanagaretna et al., 
2004; El Sood, 2012; Leventis et al, 2011) 
3 Another justification for using loan portfolio size, rather than total asset, is due to my observation that most 
studies do not find strong significant size effect on provisions and when they do, it is significant mostly at the 
10% s.f level. (for example, Laeven and Majononi, 2003). Therefore, provision/reserves tend to have a weak 
relation to bank size proxy by total asset. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Provisions and Reserves 
An important distinction between loan loss provision (LLP) and loan loss reserve (LLR) is 
needed. Provisions and reserves behave differently.  
Provisions are a deduction from gross interest income in the income statement while 
reserves are yearly accumulation of provisions in the balance sheet. Also, reserves behave 
like capital and are used to shield banks against unusual expected losses. According to 
Bikker and Metzemaker (2005), LLP reflect managerial decision at a point in time (annual) 
while loan loss reserves is the accumulation of annual net provisions over time that 
reflects actual expected loan losses. Also, loan loss reserve is perceived to be linked 
directly to the quality of bank loan portfolio and is susceptible to short-term fluctuations 
arising from macroeconomic developments and the solvency of individual counterparties 
(Bikker and Metzemaker, 2005). Bikker and Metmaker (2005) went on to investigate 
whether the same variables that explain provisioning behaviour also explains the 
behaviour of reserves. They found that the same explanatory variables that explain loan 
loss provision also explain the level of loan loss reserve but less significantly. However, 
they concluded that the level of reserve is likely to be influenced more significantly by 
outside shocks and insignificantly by managerial incentives such as capital management 
motives and income smoothing motives. 
2.2. Theory 
The theoretical literature argue that credit risk represents an important driver of the 
riskiness of banks and that current period loan growth is likely to have an impact on 
current period provisions (e.g. Liu and Ryan, 2006). In theory, a positive relation between 
credit risk and provisions is expected (e.g., Liu and Ryan, 2006; Foos et al. 2010). Following 
this reasoning, incremental increase in loan should lead to incremental increase in 
reserves (e.g. Kanagaretnam et al, 2003). Also, Laeven and Majnoni (2002) note that 
continuous increase in bank lending is generally associated with lower monitoring efforts 
and deterioration in loan quality, thus, necessitating increased provisions. Thus, a prudent 
bank is expected to report a positive relationship between the level of loan loss reserves 
and credit risk. A common measure for bank credit risk exposure in the literature is loan 
growth or change in outstanding loans (e.g. Cavallo and Majnoni, 2001; Laeven and 
Majnoni, 2002; Lobo and Yang, 2001). Nonetheless, Lobo and Yang (2001) argue that, in 
reality, the relationship between loan growth and LLP is largely unpredictable due to 
uncertainty in the quality of incremental loans. 
2.3. Determinants of LLR 
Provisioning research identify three (3) bank-specific determinants of loan loss reserves: 
bank asset portfolio composition, credit risk and the state of the business cycle. Many 
provisioning studies employed these variables as control variables when examining 
income smoothing practices while few studies employed these variables as bank-specific 
factors. In this study, I employ these variables as bank-specific factors. 
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Asset-portfolio risk is an indication of banks’ overall risk from the financial analyst 
perspective. It is a measure of how much loans banks have in relation to total asset. The 
use of loan to asset ratio as a proxy for overall risk exposure on bank portfolio is common 
across the literature (e.g. Sinkey and Greenawalt, 1991; Laeven and Majnoni, 200; Hasan 
and Wall, 2004; Floro, 2010). Intuitively, portfolio risk should influence the level of 
reserves if bank asset portfolio contains more loans than securitized assets. This is 
because loan loss reserve tends to behave like capital used as a buffer against losses 
arising from excessive risk-taking.  
Thus, when portfolio risk is high, banks tend to increase LLR as a buffer to absorb losses in 
the portfolio. The higher the risk, the greater the need for more reserves. Sinkey and 
Greenawalt (1991) found a significant positive relationship between loan-asset ratio and 
level of loan loss reserve. Hasan and Wall (2004) investigated the determinants of loan 
loss reserve and found that loan-asset ratio is significant and positively related to loan loss 
reserve for US banks and Japanese bank samples but negative and insignificant for 
Canadian banks. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) found a significant positive relationship 
between loan loss reserve and bank portfolio risk. Consistent with prior studies, I expect a 
positive relationship between reserves and bank portfolio. However, a significant negative 
relationship, if any, is likely to indicate a largely diversified bank portfolio. 
Credit risk, proxy by loan growth, is also a determinant of the level of loan loss reserve. 
Lobo and Yang (2001) found a significant positive relationship between loan growth and 
provisions not reserves. Laeven and Majnoni (2002) found a weakly significant negative 
relationship between loan growth and provisions for Europe, Asia, US and Latin America. 
Kanagaretnam et al (2003) found a significant positive relationship between provisions 
and loan growth. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) found a significant positive relationship 
between loan loss reserves and loan growth for US banks but insignificant evidence for 
European banks. Bushman and Williams (2012) found a significant positive relationship 
between provisions and loan growth. Overall, I hypothesize a positive relationship 
between bank credit risk exposure (loan growth) and LLR. 
Another determinant of the level of loan loss reserves is the state of the business cycle. 
Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) found strong evidence of procyclical pattern in loan loss 
reserve during recessionary period for the full bank sample. However, this procyclical 
behaviour is significant for European banks but insignificant for US banks. Floro (2010) 
found a significant negative relationship between loan loss reserves and the business cycle 
for Philippine banks while Ozili (2015) found a negative relationship for Nigerian banks. A 
positive sign on GDP growth rate would suggest that LLR behaves like capital. That is, 
banks build up reserves during good times and use up reserves during bad times, thus, a 
positive relationship.   
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3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. LLR and Credit Supply Hypothesis 
Monetary authorities tend to facilitate money supply to the economy through banking 
institutions. As bank loan portfolio increases, the supply of credit to the economy also 
increases, at least, in principle.  Therefore, the size of bank loan portfolio is an indicator of 
bank credit supply. If monetary authorities want expansionary credit supply and act as a 
guarantor against significant expected loan losses, banks may have some incentive to 
underestimate loan loss reserve to boost credit supply (gross loan) to the economy in line 
with monetary policy expectations. This describes the credit supply hypothesis. Following 
this reasoning, I hypothesize that, if banks are concerned about meeting monetary policy 
expectations, a negative relationship between reserves and bank loan portfolio is 
expected. 
H1: A negative relationship between LLR and loan portfolio size is expected. 
3.2. LLR and Credit Smoothing Hypothesis. 
Monetary authorities expect banks to increase their supply of bank credit to boost 
consumption and investment in the economy. This expectation is usually intense to speed 
up recovery from recession. Also, banks that significantly decrease the size of loan 
portfolio in bad times tend to attract regulatory attention. Therefore, in order to avoid 
such regulatory scrutiny, banks tend to smooth the level of credit supply over time. There 
are two explanations for this. 
First, bank managers are concerned that excessive supply of credit can have unintended 
signaling effect to the stock market (that is, investors might interpret excessive credit 
supply as a signal for excessive risk-taking which is generally associated low loan quality). 
Therefore, banks tend to strike a balance between supplying excessive credit to satisfy 
monetary authorities and the need to prevent unintended signaling effect to the stock 
market. 
Second, increased supply of credit is a good thing to the economy but too much of a good 
thing can be a bad thing due to adverse selection. Therefore, banks attempt to avoid 
excessive loan supply by using accounting techniques to influence the size of gross loans. 
Following both reasoning, there is a reason to believe that banks tend to smooth credit 
supply by overstating (understating) loan loss reserves when loan portfolio is expected to 
be unusually high (low) to minimize unintended signaling to investors and to avoid 
regulatory attention. This behaviour is described here as ‘credit smoothing’, hence, the 
credit smoothing hypothesis.  
This hypothesis suggest that, if banks are strongly concerned about the signaling 
consequences of excessive credit supply, then, banks will use loan-decreasing smoothing 
strategies to reduce the unusually large size of gross loan during good times and use loan-
increasing strategies, in bad times, to boost loan portfolio size when loan size is unusually 
low to avoid regulatory discipline. Therefore, I hypothesize that the need to avoid 
unintended signaling tends to motivate managers to smooth bank credit supply.  
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Thus, a positive relationship between reserves and bank loan size would indicate evidence 
for credit smoothing. Therefore, the second hypothesis is: 
H2: A significant positive relationship between LLR and loan portfolio size is expected. 
3.3. Reserves Behaviour during a Crisis 
The behaviour of loan loss reserve during a crisis might provide new information about 
bank managers’ priority during the crisis - whether to smooth credit supply or to boost 
credit supply in line with the expectations of monetary expectations. During recessionary 
periods, I propose that banks may not necessarily increase the size of its loan portfolio due 
to credit risk concerns rather banks might understate reserves to boost net loans upwards 
to satisfy regulators and monetary authorities. Therefore, I expect evidence for credit 
smoothing during a recession. This expectation is intuitive, particularly, when monetary 
authorities act as a guarantor against severe credit losses arising from complying with 
monetary authorities. A negative sign would suggest support the credit supply hypothesis. 
H3: A positive relationship between LLR and bank loan portfolio size is expected. 
On the other hand, it may be difficult to predict the behaviour of LLR because managerial 
actions during a recession or crisis are influenced by a combination of factors such as 
credit risk concerns, expectations of monetary authorities, stock market signaling, state of 
the business cycle and other country-specific considerations, etc. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Data and Sample Selection 
The data include banks’ balance sheet information and country-specific macroeconomic 
indicators obtained from Bankscope database and World Bank databank, respectively, 
over the period 2004 to 2013. Bankscope is believed to provide the widest coverage of 
banking data for several countries. I include countries that have bank data from 2004-
2013. This period covers a full business cycle for all the countries included. Unfortunately, 
some crucial variables are not reported for many banking organizations on Bank Scope 
and even where reported are only available for some years and unavailable for other 
periods. I have then eliminated banks that over the sample period had no reporting data 
for crucial variables for four consecutive years of balance sheet observations, in order to 
control for the consistency and quality of bank reporting. The resulting sample included 82 
banks from 11 countries, with a total of 820 bank-year observations. The sample is divided 
into regions: Europe, US, Asia and Africa.  
4.2. Estimation Procedure 
Panel data cross-section and time series regression with fixed effect is employed. This is 
consistent with Cavallo and Majnoni (2001) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005). I modify 
the equation to introduce the credit smoothing variable into the model containing other 
determinants of the level of reserves. I adopt three model specifications.  
Journal of Business, Economics & Finance (2015), Vol4 (2)                                               Ozili, 2015 
308 
The first model specifies theoretical determinants of reserves and tests the two main 
hypotheses. The second model tests the crisis-reserve hypothesis. The third model tests 
for robustness by employing a more precise measure of credit risk rather than loan 
growth. Another robustness check examines country-specific regression to control for 
country-specific differences. The only weakness of bank-country analysis is that it reduces 
the degree of freedom of bank-country observations. However, this approach is preferred 
in order to avoid the ‘dummy variable trap’ arising from using multiple dummy variables 
to control for multiple cross-country and institutional differences.  
Therefore, the econometric specification is given as: 
Model 1:  
LLRi,t = NPLi,t+ LOTAi,t + LOANi,t + InGLi,t + GDPRj + ɛi,t  
Model 2:  
CRISIS*LLRi,t = CRISIS*NPLi,t + CRISIS*LOTAi,t + CRISIS*LOANi,t + CRISIS*InGLi,t + 
CRISIS*GDPRj + ɛi,t 
Model 3:  
LLRi,t = NPLi,t + LOTAi,t + negLOANi,t + INGLi,t + GDPRj + ɛi,t 
Where, 
LLR = ratio of loan loss reserve to gross loan for bank i at time t 
NPL = ratio of impaired loans ratio gross loans for bank i at time t 
LOTA = ratio of net loans over total asset for bank i at time t 
INGL = natural logarithm of gross loan for bank i at time t 
LOAN = change in gross loan for bank i at time t. 
negLOAN = negative change in gross loan for bank i at time t. 
GDPR = growth in gross domestic product. 
CRISIS = I introduce a financial crisis dummy variable. The dummy variables take a value of 
one during the financial crisis period (2007-2009) and otherwise, zero. 
Bank-specific determinants of interest in this analysis are LOAN, LOTA and INGL. To test 
the credit smoothing hypothesis, the key variable of interest is the InGL variable. The 
dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss reserves over gross loans. This is consistent 
with Bhat (2010). Explanatory variables include bank-specific determinants (LOAN, NPL 
and LOTA) and country-specific determinants (GDPR).  At bank level, I employ NPL to 
control for non-discretionary influences on reserves. This is consistent with prior studies, 
for example, Beaver and Engel (1996).  
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NPL, the ratio of nonperforming loans to gross loan is an ex post measure of loan portfolio 
quality and may contain information on bank risk not captured by traditional measures of 
risk. I exclude income smoothing and capital management variables from the model 
because Bikker and Metzemaker (2005) found that the level of reserve had less statistical 
significance with loan loss reserves 
5. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics and correlations 
Table 1 present the descriptive statistics for the full sample. On average, LLR is 2.58. 
Notably, LLR is relatively large for Indonesian and African banks and is relatively lower for 
South African banks. On average, NPL is 4.03 (median=2.88), LOAN is 14.28(median = 
11.74; InGL is 17.45 (median=18), LOTA is 51.89 (median =52.50) and GDPR is 4.02 
(median=4.00). The correlation statistics in Table 6 report a negative and significant 
relationship between LLR and InGL while LLR reports a positive and significant relationship 
with GDPR and NPL is reported. The negative correlation between GDPR and NPL indicates 
procyclical behavior associated with problem loan. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
   Region Some Countries 
Var. Statistic Full 
Sample 
Europe US Asia Africa UK China India Indonesia South 
Africa 
LLR Mean 
Median 
S.D 
2.58 
2.04 
2.34 
2.34 
2.20 
1.42 
2.18 
1.91 
1.32 
2.55 
1.98 
2.09 
3.09 
2.09 
3.46 
2.13 
1.59 
1.56 
2.54 
2.30 
1.67 
1.75 
1.51 
1.27 
3.86 
2.80 
2.76 
1.72 
1.75 
0.69 
NPL Mean 
Median 
S.D 
4.03 
2.88 
4.42 
4.34 
3.74 
2.76 
3.09 
2.40 
3.27 
2.95 
2.32 
3.13 
5.95 
3.97 
6.63 
4.59 
3.41 
3.32 
1.83 
1.12 
2.49 
3.05 
2.99 
1.44 
4.09 
3.16 
3.51 
3.67 
3.58 
1.98 
LOAN Mean 
Median 
S.D 
14.28 
11.74 
20.06 
6.25 
2.24 
21.10 
9.16 
20.18 
20.17 
19.27 
16.86 
19.69 
17.57 
15.99 
16.30 
6.46 
2.35 
25.93 
20.84 
16.41 
18.57 
21.49 
20.53 
12.36 
27.62 
24.31 
22.42 
11.92 
12.01 
11.07 
INGL Mean 
Median 
S.D 
17.45 
18.00 
3.16 
19.05 
20.03 
2.31 
19.83 
20.17 
0.94 
17.51 
17.56 
2.54 
14.53 
14.17 
3.24 
19.47 
20.34 
1.86 
19.52 
19.55 
0.99 
16.56 
16.51 
0.72 
14.82 
14.96 
1.99 
17.61 
17.82 
0.58 
LOTA Mean 
Median 
S.D 
51.89 
52.50 
15.91 
44.76 
41.55 
15.48 
43.11 
43.86 
19.17 
55.20 
54.61 
13.81 
57.21 
56.26 
12.75 
41.87 
38.78 
12.45 
54.20 
52.32 
14.15 
55.35 
58.55 
8.21 
61.53 
63.15 
11.42 
61.67 
66.29 
13.61 
GDPR Mean 
Median 
S.D 
4.02 
4.00 
3.69 
1.09 
2.00 
2.29 
1.70 
2.00 
1.89 
6.28 
6.00 
3.73 
4.66 
5.50 
2.68 
1.29 
2.00 
2.11 
10.04 
10.00 
1.89 
7.54 
8.00 
2.07 
5.82 
6.00 
0.39 
3.31 
4.00 
2.38 
Obs  749 170 105 283 190 80 77 59 87 89 
5.2. Discussion of Result 
Main Result 
Regression 1 shows that most variables are consistent with prior expectations. After 
pooling the full bank sample, NPL, LOTA and InGL report significant coefficient signs. InGL 
variable reports a significant negative sign in support of the credit supply hypothesis 
indicating that banks reduce the level of reserves to boost the size of its loan portfolio 
either to earn high profit or to meet the credit supply expectations of monetary 
authorities. Unlike Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) and Hasan and Wall (2004)’s findings, 
the LOTA variable report a significant negative sign for the pooled sample.  
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The significant and negative sign indicates that bank loan portfolio appears to be largely 
diversified. LOAN variable did not report any significant sign. This suggests that the level of 
reserve is not influenced by current credit risk exposure. 
Regression 2 in Table 2 reports regional results. NPL is significant across all regional bank 
samples. Also, InGL coefficient reports a significant positive sign for US banks (t=2.97). This 
supports the credit smoothing hypothesis. InGL reports a significant negative sign for 
Asian banks (t=-5.36). This supports the credit supply hypothesis. InGL is not significant 
across European and African bank samples. Also, LOTA reports a significant negative sign 
for Asian banks (t=-5.58), European banks (t=-1.89) and African banks (t=-3.28) but not for 
US banks. LOAN does not report any significant sign for regional bank samples. GDP 
reports a significant negative sign for US banks only. This indicates procyclical loan loss 
reserve behaviour. 
Table 2: Main Result 
  Reg 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
  Overall Regional result  Some country-specific results 
  All banks US Europe Africa Asia UK China India 
Varia
bles 
Exp./ 
Sign 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
C ? 3.776*** 
4.25 
-13.64*** 
-3.07 
2.438*** 
2.86 
2.026 
1.10 
14.32*** 
8.68 
25.75*** 
4.42 
-10.71*** 
-3.12 
-1.309 
-0.29 
NPL + 0.356*** 
23.97 
0.309*** 
6.74 
0.401*** 
17.97 
0.403*** 
15.05 
0.28*** 
10.87 
0.42*** 
13.91 
0.719*** 
23.61 
0.706*** 
9.55 
LOAN +/- -0.002 
-0.71 
-0.0005 
-0.12 
-0.003 
-1.001 
0.014 
1.55 
-0.046 
-0.14 
0.003 
0.745 
0.009* 
1.87 
0.017* 
1.76 
GDPR - 0.006 
0.28 
-0.166*** 
-4.13 
0.029 
1.38 
0.071 
1.38 
-0.046 
-1.29 
0.014 
0.375 
-0.032 
-0.69 
0.068 
1.59 
LOTA +/- -0.018*** 
-2.67 
0.015 
1.09 
-0.017* 
-1.89 
-0.049*** 
-3.28 
-0.074*** 
-5.58 
-0.02 
-1.55 
-0.015 
-0.95 
-0.056*** 
2.72 
INGL + -0.098** 
-2.01 
0.732*** 
2.97 
-0.056 
-1.37 
0.059 
0.54 
-0.462*** 
-5.36 
-1.271*** 
-4.11 
0.660*** 
4.45 
0.188 
0.69 
Adj R  75.28 70.61 82.93 81.66 72.99 83.46 90.8 81.57 
F-stat  27.48*** 17.65*** 35.19*** 34.65*** 23.42*** 31.66*** 58.71 21.24 
Obsv.  749 105 170 190 283 80 77 59 
Robustness Test 
i. Country specific result 
To test the argument that country-specific factors may have an impact on the level of 
bank loan loss reserve, I examine country-specific bank samples. The results are reported 
in Table 2 and 3. The results indicate that InGL is significant for UK, US, Chinese banks. I 
find strong evidence for credit smoothing incentives among banks in US, China and 
Uganda and find strong evidence for credit supply incentives among banks in the UK and 
Indonesia. This is indicated by the positive and negative sign on the InGL variable, 
respectively. These conflicting results suggest that managerial discretion on the level of 
loan loss reserves depend on country-specific factors. Similarly, LOTA report a significant 
negative sign for banks in India and Indonesia but reports a positive and significant sign 
banks in France and Germany. LOAN appears to be significant only for African banks, 
particularly, Kenya and South Africa. 
Journal of Business, Economics & Finance (2015), Vol4 (2)                                               Ozili, 2015 
311 
Table 3: Cross-country Regression 
 France Germany Indonesia Japan Kenya South Africa Uganda 
Var. Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
C 2.86 
0.76 
-0.518 
-0.48 
18.62*** 
7.85 
7.003 
1.003 
15.17*** 
4.67 
6.97* 
1.69 
-14.12** 
-2.64 
NPL 0.509*** 
9.48 
0.374*** 
8.55 
0.313*** 
5.94 
0.024* 
1.65 
0.445*** 
11.65 
0.17*** 
6.04 
0.272*** 
4.46 
LOTA 0.027** 
2.34 
0.034* 
1.93 
-0.109*** 
-4.81 
0.003 
0.18 
-0.287*** 
-6.21 
-0.003 
-0.94 
-0.014 
-0.52 
INGL -0.161 
-0.84 
-0.027 
-0.74 
-0.459*** 
-4.44 
-0.29 
0.34 
0.065 
0.44 
-0.313 
-1.32 
1.293** 
2.73 
LOAN 0.003 
0.46 
0.002 
0.37 
-0.0004 
-0.07 
-0.008 
-1.61 
0.029* 
1.76 
-0.011** 
-2.44 
-0.009 
-0.77 
GDPR 0.032 
1.15 
0.003 
0.11 
-0.428 
-1.26 
-0.003 
-0.17 
0.009 
0.08 
-0.005 
-0.32 
0.156 
1.42 
Adj R² 89.27 87.11 82.76 27.39 84.53 87.23 83.38 
F-stat 34.29*** 35.45*** 32.76*** 3.23 30.81*** 43.95*** 24.83*** 
ii. During financial Crisis 
I expand the baseline model to introduce a crisis dummy as shown in Model 2. The results 
are reported in Table 4 During the crisis, I find strong evidence for credit smoothing across 
all banks indicated by the InGL coefficient. This indicates that credit smoothing is a top 
priority for bank managers during recessionary periods. Also, GDPR coefficient report find 
strong evidence for procyclical loan loss reserve behaviour among US banks but counter-
cyclical reserve behaviour among Asian banks.  
Table 4: Financial Crisis Regression Result 
 Combined 
Sample 
Europe US Asia Africa 
Variable Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
C 0.0114 
0.29 
-0.002 
-0.064 
-0.009 
-0.15 
0.008 
0.14 
0.025 
0.27 
CRISIS*NPL 0.247*** 
17.53 
0.289*** 
7.31 
-0.029 
-1.00 
0.114*** 
4.17 
0.364*** 
14.21 
CRISIS*LOTA 0.006* 
1.68 
0.001 
0.311 
0.001 
0.17 
0.006 
0.92 
-0.034** 
-2.44 
CRISIS*INGL 0.052*** 
4.93 
0.042*** 
3.76 
0.119*** 
6.50 
0.067*** 
3.47 
0.131*** 
2.71 
CRISIS*LOAN 0.003 
1.06 
0.00001 
0.98 
-0.009** 
-2.05 
0.005 
1.06 
0.036*** 
3.67 
CRISIS*GDPR 0.043*** 
2.81 
-0.032 
-1.34 
-0.436*** 
-8.90 
0.061*** 
2.75 
0.054 
1.31 
Adj R² 69.22*** 86.05*** 85.37*** 65.09*** 77.63*** 
F-Stat 20.56 44.42 41.46 16.47 27.25 
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iii. Negative Loan Growth 
Next, I predict that banks that significantly decrease (increase) loan size (that is, banks 
with negative loan growth) should have low (high) reserves and vice versa. This implies a 
positive relationship.  This is intuitive because reserves should increase (decrease) as 
credit risk exposure increases (decreases). However, if a negative sign is observed, this 
might imply that bank loan loss reserve decisions might be motivated for reasons other 
than credit risk motivations. This would have serious implication for financial reporting 
and might be construed as misleading investors. To investigate this, I substitute the LOAN 
variable with negLOAN variable. I create a dummy variable ‘negLOAN’ that takes the value 
of ‘1’ if change in loan is negative, otherwise zero. The negLOAN represent a negative 
change in loan growth. The model specification is given by Model 3. Table 5 report a 
significant positive sign on the negLOAN variable for the full bank sample and for US 
banks. Interestingly, I find a significant negative sign for Chinese banks. Also, Indian banks 
and African banks report a negative but this sign is insignificant. These findings suggest 
that some banks appear to have non-credit risk-related motivations for determining the 
level of reserves as well bank-country and institutional factors. 
Table 5: Negative Loan Growth Model 
 World US Europe Africa Asia UK China india 
 Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
C 3.74*** 
4.22 
-12.1*** 
-4.31 
2.385*** 
2.79 
2.769 
1.45 
13.83*** 
8.54 
23.44*** 
4.36 
-6.488** 
-2.31 
3.13 
0.92 
NPL 0.354*** 
24.01 
0.278*** 
6.25 
0.397*** 
17.01 
0.397*** 
15.17 
0.285*** 
11.14 
0.398*** 
11.62 
0.704*** 
25.24 
0.687*** 
9.32 
negLOAN 0.321** 
2.46 
0.457** 
2.39 
0.136 
1.11 
-0.468 
-1.13 
0.386 
1.56 
0.143 
0.63 
-1.726*** 
-3.39 
-0.449 
-1.18 
GDPR 0.017 
0.78 
-0.133*** 
-3.24 
0.031 
1.47 
0.073 
1.31 
-0.045 
-1.27 
0.029 
0.77 
-0.064 
-1.55 
0.083* 
1.93 
LOTA -0.018*** 
-2.68 
0.008 
0.56 
-0.018* 
-1.97 
-0.048*** 
-3.19 
-0.075*** 
-5.71 
-0.019 
-1.44 
-0.0176 
-1.18 
-0.045** 
-2.29 
INGL -0.103** 
-2.12 
0.709*** 
2.97 
-0.055 
-1.34 
0.031 
0.27 
-0.462*** 
-5.18 
-1.153*** 
-4.04 
0.479*** 
3.89 
-0.097 
-0.48 
Adj R² 75.35 72.39 82.95 81.66 73.01 83.42 91.78 76.96 
F-stat 27.45*** 19.18*** 35.26*** 33.29*** 23.44*** 31.57 66.34*** 20.37*** 
Obsv. 745 105 170 190 283 80 77 59 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, I investigated (i) the determinants of loan loss reserves, and (ii) whether 
banks tend to smooth bank credit supply due to unintended signaling effects. I find that 
the level of loan loss reserve is influenced by bank-specific factors, particularly, loan to 
asset ratio and loan portfolio size, and insignificantly influenced by current credit risk 
consideration proxy by loan growth. I conclude that this insignificant effect on reserves 
suggests that current credit risk tend to be reflected in provisions not necessarily in 
reserves. 
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Also, the findings that some banks use loan loss reserves to smooth credit to minimize 
unintended signaling appears to be in conflict with expectations of monetary authorities, 
particularly, when significant supply of credit is needed to boost the economy during a 
recession. Thus, managerial choice to smooth credit during a crisis further amplifies the 
existing recession. This is not to suggest that credit smoothing is unethical or 
inappropriate. Rather, I argue that, the appropriateness of credit smoothing tend to 
depend on the state of the economy when credit smoothing practices takes place. Finally, 
the extent of credit smoothing will depend on concerns about stock market signaling, the 
state of the business cycle, institutional and country specific factors and on whether 
investors view the level of reserve as a value-relevant accounting number. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table 6: Full Sample Correlation 
 
 
 
Variables LLR  NPL  LOTA  LOAN  INGL  GDPR  
LLR  1.000      
        
       
NPL  0.729*** 1.000     
 0.000      
       
LOTA  -0.053 -0.049 1.000    
 0.149 0.174      
       
LOAN  -0.054 -0.151*** 0.169*** 1.000   
 0.142 0.000 0.000     
       
INGL  -0.251*** -0.276*** -0.227*** -0.284*** 1.000  
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
       
GDPR  0.076** -0.083** 0.222*** 0.379*** -0.311*** 1.000 
 0.039 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000   
       
       
 
